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F

international human rights litigation in
U.S. courts has developed with little attention to a lurking
doctrinal objection to the entire enterprise. The paradigm
international human rights case involves a suit against a
foreign government official for alleged abuses committed abroad
under color of state law. A potentially dispositive objection to this
litigation is foreign sovereign immunity. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) creates presumptive immunity for foreign
states and has no exception that would cover human rights cases.
Many courts have assumed that the FSIA has no relevance to human
rights suits as long as they are directed against state officials rather
than the state itself. Recently, however, courts have begun to reject
this assumption, and the issue is now before the Supreme Court in
Yousuf v. Samantar.1
This essay makes two contributions to the debate over whether
the FSIA applies to suits against individual foreign officials. First, it

†

1

OR THIRTY YEARS,

Curtis Bradley is the Richard A. Horvitz Professor at Duke Law School. Jack Goldsmith is
the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School.
552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, No. 08-1555 (Sept. 30, 2009).
13 GREEN BAG 2D 9

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith
shows that, contrary to what some courts have assumed, suits
against individual officials fall naturally within the plain language of
the FSIA’s immunity provisions. Second, it shows that the international law of state immunity, which is relevant to the proper interpretation of the FSIA in several ways, supports this construction.
Combining these and other points, the essay concludes that the
FSIA confers presumptive immunity in suits against state officials,
including former state officials, for their official acts committed
while in office, and that this immunity applies even in human rights
cases.

BACKGROUND

I

nternational human rights litigation in U.S. courts can be traced
to the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.2
The court in Filartiga held that Paraguayan citizens could sue a former Paraguayan police inspector for allegedly torturing and killing a
member of their family in Paraguay, in violation of international
law. In support of this holding, the court relied on the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), a then-obscure provision that had originally been
part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789. The ATS provides that “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.”3
Since Filartiga, plaintiffs from around the globe have relied on
the ATS to sue in U.S. courts for human rights abuses. In many of
these suits, as in Filartiga, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign official for
an alleged violation of international law committed on foreign soil.
The allegation of governmental conduct is often a necessary component of the plaintiff’s case, since most violations of international
law require state action.4 Because governments act through individuals, these suits in effect challenge the conduct of foreign gov2
3
4

630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 & cmt. b (1987).
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ernments. As a result, the sovereign immunity of these governments is a potentially serious obstacle to this litigation.
Courts in the United States have long accorded foreign nations
immunity from suit. Before 1976, they did so as a matter of common law, taking into account considerations of international law
and comity. In addition, starting in the late 1930s, courts began to
give essentially absolute deference to Executive Branch views on
whether immunity should be granted. Courts also accepted and applied the Executive Branch’s determination in 1952, in the Tate
Letter, that the United States would henceforth apply the “restrictive” theory of immunity, whereby foreign sovereigns could be sued
for their private, commercial acts, but not their public, sovereign
acts.5
In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA, a statute that purported to
codify the international law of sovereign immunity, including the
restrictive theory, and to move immunity determinations from the
Executive Branch to the courts. The FSIA provides that a “foreign
state,” including a state’s “agency or instrumentality,” is immune
from suit in U.S. courts unless the suit falls within one of the FSIA’s
specified exceptions to immunity.6 Importantly, the FSIA’s general
tort exception is limited to situations in which the damage or injury
occurs in the United States.7 In 1996, Congress added an exception
for certain egregious acts committed abroad, but the exception applies only to a few “state sponsor[s] of terrorism.”8 As a result, the
FSIA appears to contain no exception for international human rights
cases.
It is unclear from the text of the FSIA whether it covers suits,
like the suit against the police inspector in Filartiga, against individual officials. The court in Filartiga did not address the issue, even
5

6
7
8

See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983)
(describing history recounted in this paragraph).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-04.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
The “state sponsor of terrorism” exception currently applies to suits against four
states: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. For the latest iteration of this exception, see
28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
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though the international law violation in that case – torture – required government action. Many of the post-Filartiga human rights
decisions have similarly failed to consider the issue of immunity.
Outside the human rights context, the Ninth Circuit held in an
influential 1990 decision, Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, that
suits against individual officers for actions taken in an official capacity are covered by the FSIA.9 That case involved a suit by a Philippine citizen against a member of a Philippine governmental commission charged with recovering wealth allegedly absconded by the
Marcos regime. Noting that foreign officials received common law
immunity before enactment of the FSIA, the court reasoned that it
would be “illogical” to think that Congress in the FSIA eliminated
the application of sovereign immunity to individuals “implicitly and
without comment.” The court added that “to allow unrestricted
suits against individual foreign officials acting in their official capacities . . . [would allow] litigants to accomplish indirectly what the
Act barred them from doing directly,” and “would defeat the purposes of the Act.” It concluded that individual officials who act on
behalf of the state can reasonably be considered “agencies or instrumentalities” of the state for purposes of the FSIA.
Most circuit courts to have addressed this issue have agreed with
Chuidian.10 In recent years, however, two circuit courts have staked
out a contrary view. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the FSIA
defines “agency or instrumentality” as a “separate legal person,” a
phrase that “refers to a legal fiction – a business entity which is a
legal person.”11 It added that “[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it
would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.” The Fourth
Circuit in Yousuf agreed with these points, and also noted that indi9

912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d
Cir. 2008); Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir.
2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho, 182 F.3d 380, 38889 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
11
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005).
10
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viduals do not easily fit within the FSIA’s jurisdictional and service
of process provisions for an “agency or instrumentality.”12

MOVING BEYOND
“AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY”

W

e agree with those courts that have concluded that suits
against individual foreign officials are not easily accommodated within the “agency or instrumentality” language of the FSIA.
There is, however, a better textual basis for applying the FSIA:
these suits can be considered to be directed against the foreign state
itself for purposes of the FSIA.13 Since a state acts through individuals, a suit against an individual official for actions carried out on behalf of the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state, even if
that is not how the plaintiff captions his or her complaint. This approach is consistent with the FSIA’s definition of “foreign state,”
which does not purport to be comprehensive, but rather simply
“includes” various entities, including agencies and instrumentalities.14
A number of courts have gestured towards this approach even
though they have ultimately rested their decisions on the FSIA’s
“agency or instrumentality” language. In Chuidian, for example, the
Ninth Circuit noted that “a suit against an individual acting in his
official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.”15 More recently, the Second Circuit observed that “a
claim against an agency of state power, including a state officer act12

552 F.3d at 380-82.
See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Officials and Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Courts, ASIL
INSIGHT (Mar. 17, 2009), www.asil.org/insights090317.cfm.
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (“[a] foreign state . . . includes” listed entities) (emphasis
added). This approach is also consistent with the FSIA’s exception to immunity
for tort claims, which, in allowing a foreign state to be sued when an employee of
the state commits a tort within the United States “while acting within the scope of
his office or employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), recognizes that a tort committed by a state official can be an act of the state.
15
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
13
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ing in his official capacity, can be in effect a claim against the
state.”16
Treating a suit against a state officer for his official acts as a suit
against the state itself is also consistent with the pre-FSIA common
law of immunity. Over a century ago, the Second Circuit explained: “[B]ecause the acts of the official representatives of the state
are those of the state itself, when exercised within the scope of their
delegated powers, courts and publicists have recognized the immunity of public agents from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts
done within their own states in the exercise of the sovereignty
thereof.”17 The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, published in 1965, similarly concluded that, under the
common law, a foreign state’s sovereign immunity extended to a
“minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction
would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.”18
This common law backdrop is significant. As a statute that regulates in the area of the common law, the FSIA should “be read with
a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.”19 Nothing in the FSIA, however, suggests an intent to
withdraw the immunity that the common law would have granted
in suits against foreign officials. Taking account of the proper common law backdrop is particularly significant in cases brought under
the ATS – the principal statutory vehicle for international human
rights cases – since the ATS does not even create a statutory cause

16

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 84 (2d Cir. 2008).
Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d on other grounds, 168
U.S. 250 (1897); see also 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 179 (1906) (collecting authorities from the late 1700s through Underhill).
18
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) (1965); see also Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d
Cir. 1971) (endorsing this provision of the Restatement).
19
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); see also Matar v. Dichter,
563 F.3d 9, 13-14 (2d Cir. 2009) (making this point).
17
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of action but rather has been construed as delegating limited common law authority to the courts.20
Treating official capacity suits brought against individual officials
as suits against the state is also consistent with, and indeed required
by, the international law of sovereign immunity. As Hazel Fox, a
leading expert on foreign sovereign immunity, explains, “any act
performed by the individual as an act of the State enjoys the immunity which the State enjoys.”21 Many courts around the world have
concluded that the international law of foreign sovereign immunity
applies to suits against officials acting in an official capacity.22 This
conclusion is also reflected in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, which includes within its
definition of the “state” that is entitled to immunity “representatives
of the State acting in that capacity.”23
Courts outside the United States have interpreted their domestic
foreign sovereign immunity laws in light of this international law
principle even when those laws were unclear on the point. For example, the United Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978, like the
FSIA, makes the “State” presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts subject to discrete exceptions, but also like
20

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 721 (2004) (construing the ATS
as “strictly jurisdictional” but as nevertheless “underwrit[ing] litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the law of nations”).
21
HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008); see also, e.g., 1
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1996).
22
See, e.g., Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006]
UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270, at para. 10 (United Kingdom); Schmidt v. Home
Secretary of the Government of the United Kingdom [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301,
(1994) 103 I.L.R. 322, 323-325 (Ireland); Jaffe v. Miller [1993] 13 O.R.3d 745,
758-59 (Canada); Church of Scientology Case (1978) 65 I.L.R. 193, 198 (Germany); see also Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as Beneficiary of State Immunity:
Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 261,
274 (2001) (“The vast majority of cases in various jurisdictions have recognized
the individual as a beneficiary of state immunity.”).
23
See UN Convention, art. 2(1)(b)(iv), G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/38/Annex (Dec. 16, 2004).
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the FSIA does not expressly include within its definition of the term
“State” government officials acting in an official capacity. Nonetheless, the British House of Lords, relying on settled international
law, interpreted “State” to include “servants or agents, officials or
functionaries of a foreign state” acting in an official capacity.24
International law, like the common law, is a significant consideration when construing the FSIA. Under the Charming Betsy canon,
courts have long construed federal statutes, where possible, not to
violate international law.25 In the absence of any relevant exception,
the United States would violate international law if it failed to confer immunity on state officials for their official acts committed while
in office. Moreover, a well-recognized purpose of the FSIA was
“codification of international law [of immunity] at the time of the
FSIA’s enactment.”26 Both in 1976 and today, international law confers immunity in suits brought against individual officers for their
official acts.

FORMER OFFICIALS

O

nce it is established that the FSIA applies to suits against individual state officers who act in an official capacity, the next
question is whether the FSIA applies to suits brought against these
officers after they leave office with respect to the official acts they
carried out while in office.
In Yousuf, the Fourth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,27 concluded that the FSIA does
not apply to suits against former officials. The question in Dole Food
was whether a corporation’s status as state-owned for purposes of
the “agency or instrumentality” portion of the FSIA’s definition of
“foreign state” should be determined at the time of the underlying
24

See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para 10; see also, e.g., Jaffe
v. Miller, supra note 22, at 759 (interpreting Canada’s immunity statute).
25
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
26
Permanent Mission of India to the UN v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199
(2007).
27
538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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activity or at the time of the lawsuit. The FSIA defines an agency or
instrumentality to include an entity “a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof.” The Supreme Court concluded from this present-tense phrasing that “instrumentality status [must] be determined at the time suit is filed.” The Fourth Circuit in Yousuf reasoned that the status of an individual defendant under the FSIA
should similarly be determined at the time of the lawsuit.28
There are reasons to question the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on
Dole Food. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Belhas v. Ya’alon, which
involved a suit brought against a retired Israeli general, Dole Food
focused on state corporations rather than state officials, and these
two classes of defendants implicate different issues.29 “While the
state may own corporations that conduct some of [its official] acts,
it need not do so,” explained the D.C. Circuit, whereas “individual
officials or agents must act as instrumentalities for anything actually
to be done.” As a result, “[t]o suppose that the sovereign’s immunity protecting the individual official in the performance of his sovereign’s business vanishes the moment he resigns, retires, or loses
an election is to establish that he had no immunity at all.” The D.C.
Circuit added that the comity aims of the FSIA are fully implicated
in a suit against a former official, because “[t]o allow the resignation
of an official involved in the adoption of policies underlying a decision or in the implementation of such decision to repeal his immunity would destroy, not enhance that comity.”
While we find the D.C. Circuit’s policy arguments persuasive,
at bottom the debate between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits about
the meaning of Dole Food assumes that the question of immunity for
former officials turns on how individuals are assimilated into the
“agency or instrumentality” language in the FSIA. If immunity in
suits against officials flows from the immunity of the state itself,
however, then Dole Food does not come in to play, and there should
be no distinction between current and former officials, because the
28
29

552 F.3d at 381-83.
See 515 F.3d 1279, 1284-86 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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state’s immunity would encompass all official acts, regardless of
whether the individuals who carried out the acts happen to be in
office at the time of the litigation.
This reading of the FSIA is consistent with the international law
of state immunity, which provides former officials with immunity
for official acts taken while in office.30 International law distinguishes between state immunity based on status (ratione personae)
and state immunity based on acts (ratione materiae). Status immunity attaches to select important offices, such as heads of state and
diplomats. This immunity extends even to acts carried out before
the official took office or committed in a personal capacity while in
office, but such immunity terminates with the office. Act immunity,
by contrast, is broader in applying to every government official,
both during and after their time in office, but also narrower in applying only to the individual’s official acts. It is this act immunity that
applies in a suit against a former official, something that the Fourth
Circuit failed to recognize.
In Matar v. Dichter, which involved a suit against the former head
of the Israeli security agency for alleged war crimes, the Second
Circuit correctly noted that “an immunity based on acts – rather
than status – does not depend on tenure in office.”31 But the court
elided the debate between the D.C. and Fourth Circuits about
whether former officials are covered by the “agency or instrumentality” language of the FSIA, reasoning that “whether the FSIA applies to former officials or not, they continue to enjoy immunity
under common law.” The court noted that the pre-FSIA common
law recognized individual official immunity for acts performed in an
official capacity. It added that during that period courts deferred to
suggestions of immunity from the Executive Branch, and that the

30

See, e.g., DRAFT ARTICLES ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR
PROPERTY, WITH COMMENTARIES 18 (1991), at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts
/instruments/english/commentaries/4_1_1991.pdf; R v. Bow St. Magistrate,
Ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (U.K.) (Millet, L.J.), reprinted in
38 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 581, 644-45 (1999).
31
563 F.3d at 14.
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Executive Branch in that case had urged the district court to apply
immunity.
In our view, Matar marks an unfortunate return to the pre-FSIA
common law regime of executive discretion in determining foreign
sovereign immunity – a regime characterized by unprincipled conferrals of immunity based on the political preferences of the presidential administration and case-by-case diplomatic pressures.32
Courts have continued to apply this pre-FSIA regime in a few cases
involving heads of state,33 but Matar’s extension of the practice to all
former officials expands the trend significantly and threatens to unravel the FSIA. The FSIA was designed to “free the Government
from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing
standards, and to ‘[assure] litigants that . . . decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.’”34 Matar’s approach to immunity for former state officials flies
in the face of these goals, and it does so unnecessarily. As we have
shown, courts can reach the legally correct conclusion that former
officials receive immunity for their official state acts through a natural application of the term “foreign state” in the FSIA, without mangling the “agency or instrumentality” definition and without returning to the regime of executive discretion that the FSIA was designed
to eliminate.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND IMMUNITY

T

he final issue is whether there is anything special about human
rights litigation that would exempt it from the considerations
discussed above. As an initial matter, nothing in the statutes that
serve as the basis for human rights litigation overrides immunity.
The Supreme Court in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp. held that the primary fount of U.S. human rights litigation,
the ATS, is subject to the FSIA’s immunity restrictions.35 The Tor32

See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004).
See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625-27 (7th Cir. 2004).
34
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1487, p. 7 (1976)).
35
488 U.S. 428 (1989).
33
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ture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is another basis for human
rights litigation in U.S. courts. This statute, enacted in 1992, provides a cause of action for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing
committed under color of foreign law.36 Like the ATS, the TVPA
does not mention immunity. This omission is significant, since the
TVPA was enacted against the backdrop of both the FSIA and the
Amerada Hess decision. Statements in the legislative history of the
TVPA confirm that the statute is subject to the immunity restrictions in the FSIA.37
Plaintiffs in human rights cases have sometimes argued for an
exception to the FSIA for violations of “jus cogens” norms of international law. A jus cogens norm is the highest norm in international
law from which no derogation is permitted.38 Frequently cited examples are the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. In
suits brought directly against foreign states, every circuit to have
considered the issue has concluded that immunity is available even
for alleged jus cogens violations.39
These jus cogens decisions implicitly or expressly assume that
human rights violations can be official acts for purposes of the FSIA.
36

28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88
(“The TVPA is subject to restrictions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976.”); S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (“[T]he TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.”). There is a statement in the
legislative history suggesting an expectation that, because the TVPA authorizes
suits only against individuals rather than states, “sovereign immunity would not
generally be an available defense.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 5. There is also a
statement, however, suggesting that even former officials might be able to invoke
the immunity protections of the FSIA in a suit brought under the TVPA if they
“could prove an agency relationship to a state.” S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 8.
38
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
39
See Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150-53 (7th Cir.
2001); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242-45
(2d Cir. 1996); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
719 (9th Cir. 1992).
37
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This assumption is further supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, which stated in the context of examining the FSIA’s commercial activities exception that police abuse and
torture were “peculiarly sovereign in nature.”40 It is also supported
by the international law of state immunity. As a general matter, the
international law of state immunity applies even when a state official acts illegally or in excess of authority.41 Moreover, most national courts to address the issue have concluded that, under international law, sovereign immunity is appropriate in civil cases even
for alleged violations of jus cogens norms.42
U.S. courts have not resolved a related issue, which is the extent
to which the acts of state officers that violate foreign domestic law
can constitute official state action for purposes of the FSIA. Some
courts view the foreign state’s position on whether the officer acted
in an official capacity to be an important factor in answering this
question,43 a sensible approach in light of the difficulties courts
would otherwise have in discerning the contours of foreign public
law. It is also worth keeping in mind that the ultimate issue for pur40

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993)
See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at 6 (collecting citations).
42
See Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Canada); Anotato Eidiko Dikasterio,
6/2002, excerpted and translated in Maria Panezi, Sovereign Immunity and Violation of
Jus Cogens Norms, 56 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 199 (2003)
(Greece); Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006]
UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (United Kingdom); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
(2001) 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (European Court of Human Rights). Some Italian
decisions contain contrary reasoning, see, e.g., Ferrini v. Germany, Cass. sez.
un., 6 Nov. 2003, n.5044, ILDC 19 (IT 2004), but they involve abuses committed within Italy and thus are distinguishable from most U.S. international human
rights cases. In any event, Italy is an outlier, and its approach is under challenge
by Germany in the International Court of Justice. See Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State (F.R.G. v. Italy) (I.C.J. filed Dec. 23, 2008).
43
Compare Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (no immunity when Philippine government said defendant’s action was not official), with Belhas, 515 F.3d
at 1283 (immunity after Israel said defendant’s action was official). But see Yousuf,
552 F.3d at 377 (foreign government said action was official but no immunity
granted).
41
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poses of immunity in this context is whether the action in question
is the conduct of the state, a question of attribution. Under international law, the state is internationally responsible for the official’s
actions, even if the official exceeded his authority or contravened
his instructions, as long as he acted “with apparent authority.”44 As a
result, international law “does not require, as a condition of a state’s
entitlement to claim immunity for the conduct of its servant or
agent, that the latter should have been acting in accordance with his
instructions or authority.”45

CONCLUSION

W

e have argued that the FSIA should be construed to confer
presumptive immunity in lawsuits brought against foreign
officials for their official acts. This conclusion, if accepted, would
narrow the scope of human rights litigation in U.S. courts. It would
not, however, affect the many other legitimate mechanisms of human rights accountability. For example, a nation can hold its officials accountable in its own courts. It can waive an official’s immunity in foreign courts.46 It can ratify a treaty that criminalizes acts in
such a way that it may eliminate state immunities in foreign
courts.47 It can agree by treaty (or through the UN Security Council) to an international tribunal, such as the International Criminal
Court, that abrogates state immunities.
These widely accepted mechanisms of human rights accountability are consistent with the international law of state immunity because they are all grounded in state consent. By contrast, human
44

See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para. 12 (quoting International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 7, commentary, and other sources).
45
See id.
46
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700 (Under Seal), 817 F.2d 1108,
1110-11 (9th Cir. 1987).
47
See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at paras. 19, 71 (explaining
the central holding in Pinochet). But cf. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, at para. 58 (Feb. 14)
(implicitly questioning the reasoning in Pinochet).
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rights accountability via civil lawsuits directed at foreign officials for
their conduct abroad has no basis in any treaty or any other act of
state consent. Such an approach to accountability, though adopted
by some lower courts in the United States, has “not attracted the
approbation of states generally.”48 It is also, according to the British
House of Lords, “contrary to customary international law.”49 Congress could nevertheless decide to endorse such an approach, but it
has not yet done so.

48

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 47, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, at para. 48.
49
See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 22, at para. 99.
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